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Investment in private offerings of securities, those that take place off of 
public exchanges and that are exempt from federal disclosure rules 
applicable to public offerings, is primarily available to investors on the 
basis of wealth. The wealthy are presumed sophisticated enough to make 
informed decisions about what to buy without mandatory disclosures 
applicable to public offerings. Yet the financial crisis of 2008 made clear 
that wealthy and ostensibly sophisticated investors can make tremendous 
mistakes and suffer enormous losses. Those losses are a problem when the 
investor serves a public goal, such as providing income to public sector 
employees. This Article argues that investment in private offerings by 
institutions serving a public mission should be limited to ensure that public 
ends are protected. 
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Private Offerings and Public Ends:  
Reconsidering the Regime for Classification of 
Investors Under the Securities Act of 1933 
JONATHAN D. GLATER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
To an ever greater degree, we rely on investments in securities1 to 
achieve socially desirable public goals, such as enabling saving for 
retirement.2 One might expect that as a result, investment activity of 
entities managing workers’ retirement savings, for example, might be 
narrowly circumscribed to ensure they achieve their goal. Yet federal 
securities laws do not provide for consideration of an institutional 
investor’s raison d’être in determining whether that institution can or 
should buy securities in private offerings. Private offerings are potentially 
riskier transactions that take place off of public exchanges, are typically3 
available by invitation only, and are exempt from the formal federal 
                                                                                                                          
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine. The author wishes to thank 
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Lawrence G. Baxter, Deborah A. DeMott, Jill Fisch, Camille Gear-Rich, 
Marc-Tizoc González, Donald Langevoort, Sarah Lawsky, Stephen Lee, Christopher Leslie, Stephen 
Rich, Frank Partnoy, Michael Perino, Elizabeth Pollman, Elbert L. Robertson, Bertrall Ross, Margaret 
V. Sachs, Kenneth Stahl, Christopher Whytock, and participants in the 2015 National Business Law 
Scholars Conference and the 2012 John Mercer Langston Law Faculty Writing Workshop for 
invaluable help refining the ideas in this Article. The author is deeply indebted to Joy Shoemaker, 
Brendan Starkey, Christina Tsou, and Jackie Woodside of the University of California, Irvine Law 
Library for their expert research assistance. 
1 See William J. Wiatrowski, The Last Private Industry Pension Plans: A Visual Essay, 135 
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 3 (Dec. 2012), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2012/12/art1full.pdf [http://per 
ma.cc/E8AW-XPJ8] (reporting that only ten percent of all private sector businesses offer defined 
benefit retirement plans). Additionally, more than two-thirds of workers in 2011 depended on defined 
contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans, for retirement income. FAQs About Benefits—Retirement 
Issues, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., http://www.ebri.org/publications/benfaq/index.cfm?fa=retfaq14 
[http://perma.cc/BH9V-GAWN] (last visited Jan. 27, 2015). 
2 Another example is saving to pay for education expenses. But there are also institutions that 
serve the needs of third parties and invest funds in financial markets to support the business, like 
insurance companies. See infra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing insurer investments and the 
potential need for enhanced regulation).  
3 Relatively new regulations permit the advertising of opportunities to purchase unregistered 
securities without triggering the registration requirements otherwise applicable, provided that all 
purchasers of the securities sold are “accredited investors.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2) (2014). 
“Accredited investors” include banks, insurance companies, investment companies, employee benefit 
plans, and other entities with assets under management with values above specified thresholds. Id. 
§ 230.501(a) (2013). 
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disclosure rules applicable to public offerings. 
Institutional investors qualify as “accredited” and may participate in 
private offerings if they meet certain simple wealth thresholds, regardless 
of their ability to evaluate risk or to absorb potential losses. As many as 
thirty-five investors that are not accredited but that are “sophisticated” may 
also participate in private offerings.4 The rules identifying who can invest 
in private offerings thus reflect a belief in the premise that wealthy 
investors have the expertise to manage risk well, as well as the premise that 
the losses they may suffer will not have broader systemic or societal 
impact.5 This Article argues that pre-crisis investor missteps should 
provoke very critical questioning of both these premises. The Article 
contends that these standards are overly permissive and that as a result they 
endanger investors, the system in which they operate, and—most 
significantly—the public ends that some institutional investors serve. 
Court filings in cases filed by investors that have lost significant 
amounts on securities purchased in private offerings illustrate the problem. 
Court documents show that very wealthy investors in private offerings 
bought securities, the workings or potential consequences of which they 
did not understand, or chose to ignore. Some of these investors served 
public goals, such as managing retirement savings of government 
employees. Consider the experience of the San Diego County Employees 
Retirement Association (SDCERA), which as of this writing manages a 
pension fund tasked with providing retirement benefits to nearly 37,000 
current and former county employees.6 The value of the Association’s 
assets reached $8.5 billion in 2012.7 In September 2005, SDCERA 
invested $175 million in Amaranth Partners LLC, a Connecticut-based 
hedge fund,8 in a private offering. Amaranth collapsed a year later after 
losing $6.5 billion in a matter of weeks.9 SDCERA lost well over $100 
                                                                                                                          
4 See id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii). 
5 The former point is explicit in Supreme Court commentary on exempt offerings of securities; 
the latter is implicit, but has not been directly addressed. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 
119, 125 (1953) (“An offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction 
‘not involving any public offering.’”). 
6 Facts at a Glance, SAN DIEGO CNTY. EMP. RET. ASS’N 1 (Jan. 2013), https://web.archive.org/ 
web/20130522003448/http://www.sdcera.org/PDF/Facts_at_a_glance-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2A5 
-8S3F]. At the time of the pension fund’s investment in Amaranth, it served approximately 33,000 
people. Id. 
7  Id. at 2. 
8 Hedge funds are entities created with the goal of combining investment positions in different 
types of assets, with a goal of earning the maximum return in various market conditions. Hedge Funds, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/answers/hedge.htm [http://per 
ma.cc/9897-NKW6]. 
9 Jenny Anderson, After Loss, Hedge Fund Will Close, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at C6. 
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million of its original investment10 and filed a lawsuit accusing Amaranth 
of securities fraud: SDCERA claimed it had been induced to invest in 
Amaranth by false and misleading statements about the fund’s investment 
strategy.11 “SDCERA’s investment in the Fund would never have even 
occurred—and would certainly have been withdrawn—but for . . . repeated 
misrepresentation of the Fund as risk-managed, diversified, and 
conservative.”12 A federal judge dismissed SDCERA’s claim, finding that 
SDCERA was a “sophisticated investor” and, as a result, could not claim 
after the fact not to have understood, or not to have been able to monitor, 
the fund’s conduct.13 In other words, SDCERA’s wealth qualified it to 
invest in the private offering, and it either did or should have known better. 
Under the criteria typically applied to private placements,14 the judge 
was correct and the plaintiffs were sophisticated investors. This is so even 
though the complaint and briefs in the case suggest that the investors did 
not act in a sophisticated fashion; they attempted neither to verify the 
representations allegedly made by Amaranth officers nor to reconcile those 
representations with the language of the contract with the fund.15 The 
plaintiffs were unsuccessful in their federal action alleging securities fraud 
because they could not establish that they reasonably relied upon alleged 
misrepresentations by Amaranth and its officers.16 And as a consequence, 
the financial resources available to SDCERA to satisfy its obligations to 
                                                                                                                          
10 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Complaint for 
Failure to State a Claim at 17, San Diego Cnty. Emp. Ret. Ass’n v. Maounis, 749 F. Supp. 2d 104 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (07 Civ. 2618 (DAB)), 2007 WL 2960234. 
11 See id. at 1 (“[Defendants] expressly portrayed the Fund as a multi-strategy, risk-managed 
investment that eschewed the promise of ‘home run’ returns from risky gambles in favor of modest 
gains achieved through diversification, hedging and active risk management.”). 
12 Id. at 2. 
13 See Maounis, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 120–21 (explaining how SDCERA’s status as a sophisticated 
investor, and efforts by its agents to read and sign the Fund’s Subscription Agreement, made its claim 
of reliance on the Fund unreasonable). 
14 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2014) (“[A sophisticated investor] has such knowledge and 
experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the 
prospective investment.”); see also Jonathan D. Glater, Hurdles of Different Heights for Securities 
Fraud Litigants of Different Types, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 47, 74 (explaining how courts have not 
identified fixed markers of sophistication). 
15 See Maounis, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 109–10 (explaining that from December 2004 to September 
2005, SDCERA alleged that its due diligence with regards to Amaranth consisted solely of 
conversations and that it relied on representations by the Fund). 
16 See Terra Sec. ASA Konkursbo v. Citigroup, Inc., 450 F. App’x 32, 34 (2d Cir. 2011) (“‘Under 
New York law, for a plaintiff to prevail on a claim of fraud, he must prove . . . a material representation 
or omission of fact,’ as well as ‘reasonable reliance on the part of the plaintiff.’” (quoting Schlaifer 
Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 119 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 1997))); Bremanger v. Citigroup Global 
Markets Inc., 2013 WL 1294615, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Terra for an example of unreasonable 
reliance). 
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tens of thousands of people were diminished.17 
The losses suffered by SDCERA and other institutional investors with 
tens or hundreds of millions of dollars under management highlight the 
problem in securities law that is the focus of this Article: the regulations 
classifying investors to whom sellers may offer securities through private 
placements do not function as an effective screen. The limits neither 
protect investors from transactions that are too complex and/or risky for 
them, nor do they protect the achievement of the public goals that many 
institutional investors may serve. The consequences of these failures were 
evident in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, which demonstrated that 
the risks of widespread, poor investment outcomes extend well beyond the 
parties involved in particular transactions. This Article describes the 
shortcomings of the criteria18 that determine which investors may 
participate in private offerings and identifies investor characteristics that 
should better predict investor acumen. But the Article’s greater 
contribution consists of a proposal to adopt a novel criterion to evaluate the 
extent to which an investor should be able to purchase in a private offering. 
That criterion, which the Article refers to as “financial resilience,” is a 
measure of an investor’s ability to absorb losses while still achieving any 
public end that the investor serves. 
This notion of resilience incorporates into the analysis of an investor’s 
fitness to invest in a private placement the uses to which the money and 
any return on its investment are to be put, and reframes the question of 
investor sophistication—an exercise in classification—as an essential 
element in a larger, more fundamental debate over what it means for an 
entity to be “public.” The Article consequently emphasizes the extent to 
which the current regime that identifies investors eligible to participate in 
certain transactions functions in a particular historical moment, a moment 
in which the United States has reallocated a greater share of the 
responsibility for achievement of meaningful public goals away from the 
government. 
Adoption of the concept of financial resilience sets this Article’s 
discussion and proposal apart from those of prior scholars who have 
examined the difficulty of measuring investor sophistication and takes into 
account both changes in financial market participation and the greater role 
that institutional investors play in serving public goals. More than in the 
past, public pension funds, for example, which workers depend on, buy 
                                                                                                                          
17 By how much, of course, is difficult to assess; this is not information included in court filings, 
for example. 
18  Or criteria based on income or assets under management, as provided in other provisions under 
Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a), 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2014) 
(defining accredited and sophisticated investors). 
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less liquid securities directly through private offerings19 and indirectly by 
investing in entities, like hedge funds, that invest in private offerings.20 The 
2008 financial crisis makes plain that resilience matters because excessive 
investment in risky securities can contribute to systemic risk;21 when large 
financial companies suffer losses that prevent them from performing on 
their obligations, the effects ripple across markets.  
This Article is one step in a larger project exploring the implications of 
the evolution of financial markets, using the financial crisis of 2008 as a 
point of entry.22 A prior article examined post-financial crisis securities 
fraud litigation, which affords a means of protecting investors ex post, and 
argued that the legal regime governing such lawsuits favors investors in 
private offerings relative to investors that purchase in public offerings.23 
The disparity, according to the prior article, was unjustified and weakened 
an incentive for private placement investors to investigate transactions 
adequately ahead of time.24 This Article in turn focuses on the regime 
intended to protect investors ex ante from entering transactions beyond 
their capacity.25 A future article will analyze alternative means of limiting 
the participation of particular types of investors in private offerings, such 
                                                                                                                          
19 See Gretchen Morgenson, How You Can Pay Millions and Lag Behind the Market, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 20, 2013, at BU1 (“[A]lternative investments [such as hedge funds and private equity funds] now 
account for almost one-quarter of the roughly $2.6 trillion in public pension assets under management 
nationwide, up from 10 percent in 2006 . . . . Investments in public companies’ shares, by contrast, fell 
to 49 percent from 61 percent in the period.”). 
20  More private equity firms are actively wooing public pension funds as investors, as well. See, 
e.g., Julie Creswell, Buyout Firms Are Chasing Sky-High Sums for Next Moves, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 
2013, at B1 (describing efforts by thousands of private equity firms to attract “state retirement systems, 
corporate pension funds and wealthy investors” as investors, with a goal of raising $750 billion). 
21 Indeed, systemic risk could properly be viewed as a specific manifestation of the larger 
problem this Article addresses. The proper functioning of financial markets is itself a public goal, 
benefitting the larger society, and systemic risk undermines the achievement of that goal. 
22  This is a topic approached from different angles by scholars including Steven L. Schwarcz and 
Steven M. Davidoff. See Steven M. Davidoff, Paradigm Shift: Federal Securities Regulation in the 
New Millennium, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 339, 340–41 (2008) (describing changes in capital 
markets as a result of growth of private exchanges, the growing role of institutional investors and rapid 
innovation, and identifying failures of federal securities regulation to keep pace); Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1109 (questioning 
the efficacy of securities regulation regimes that make disclosure a priority when the financial crisis 
suggests that purchasers of risky securities did not understand the information disclosed); see also 
Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in 
Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1573–74 (2013) (analyzing changes to 
securities laws wrought through the JOBS Act of 2012). This Article also attempts to evaluate how 
well current legal and regulatory mechanisms protect investors and enhance stability in addressing 
potential securities fraud. This Article contributes to an ongoing discussion of links between financial 
market evolution and systemic risk, and raises questions about how to prevent the poor decisions that 
pave the way to a crisis.   
23 Glater, supra note 14, at 87–88. 
24 Id. at 51. 
25 “Capacity” in this context should be understood to encompass both investor ability to 
comprehend a transaction and ability to cope with adverse investment outcomes. 
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as developing a more nuanced and sophisticated definition of fiduciary 
duty for managers of public pension funds,26 or enacting legislative 
restrictions on public pension fund investments at the state level.27 These 
articles all reflect the concern that too many investors lacking necessary 
expertise and/or resources participate in private offerings, and in doing so 
pose a risk both to the broader financial system and to the achievement of 
public policy objectives affecting people far from Wall Street. 
The discussion that follows has four parts. Part II contends that the 
proper context for analysis of legislative and regulatory treatment of 
private offerings is the ongoing, intense debate over the meaning of the 
designation “public.”28 This Part situates the Article in that discussion, 
which in the past has focused primarily on the questions of when and why 
a particular corporate entity should be subject to a particular regulatory 
regime.29 This Part argues that the implications of taking into account the 
public effects of the conduct of a corporate entity, or indeed of any non-
governmental entity, extend much farther. 
Part III proposes that limits on participation in private offerings 
appropriately protect certain investors’ public missions. This Part provides 
a concise history of the law and regulations intended to screen investors in 
private placements and explains the significance, benefits and risks of 
these transactions in modern financial markets. This Part analyzes the 
rationale for exemptions to the general requirement that securities be 
registered. It then identifies problems under the exemption regime and 
reviews criticisms by scholars who have argued that it fails to address the 
twin problems of the sophisticated investor who is not actually 
sophisticated or the investor that, however sophisticated, should not be 
permitted to take on excessive risk because a negative investment outcome 
                                                                                                                          
26 An expanded concept of fiduciary duty could force an investor with a public mission to account 
for the possible effects of a poor investment outcome. Professor David Webber argues for adoption of a 
more nuanced definition of fiduciary duty in the context of union pension fund investment that may 
contribute to eventual elimination of union employees’ job opportunities. David Webber, The Use and 
Abuse of Labor’s Capital, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2106, 2116 (2014) (“I argue that, in connection with fund 
investments, public pension trustees’ fiduciary duties run to the participants and beneficiaries 
themselves, and not to the fund alone.”). A broader recognition of fiduciary duty could be achieved 
through litigation under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. See Anne Tucker, Retirement 
Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the Defined Contribution Society, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 153, 215–19 
(2013) (describing potential reforms strengthening the fiduciary duty). 
27 Internal rules, developed by an institution that serves a public mission or by the state whose 
employees depend on it, could also limit the extent of investment in particular types of securities. 
28 As Professor Hillary A. Sale has put it, “[t]he recent financial crisis has brought the publicness 
and impact of corporations to the forefront of people’s minds.” Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” 
Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 142 (2011). 
29 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary 
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 340–41 (2013) (observing that securities 
regulation is about more than just investor protection and that regulatory and legislative goals include 
constraining corporate power). 
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would compromise its ability to complete its public mission. 
Part IV outlines a proposal for adoption of superior criteria regulating 
access to private offerings, and uses the experience of SDCERA to 
illustrate how the proposal would apply. The proposal includes an 
alternative framework for classification of investors based on the investors’ 
prior experience. More importantly, though, the proposal subordinates the 
determination of expertise on the basis of investor characteristics to 
protection of any public goal that the investor serves, thus imposing on the 
current regulatory framework new requirements that take into account the 
publicness of the investor’s mission. This proposal advocates adoption of a 
more flexible, nuanced version of the restriction on public pension fund 
participation in private offerings that existed prior to 1989.30 
Part V concludes. 
II.  PUBLICNESS 
In proposing that the public purpose of investment should affect 
regulatory restrictions on the transactions an investor can participate in, 
this Article argues that investment activity that is not currently understood 
as “public” should be. Consequently, the first step must be clarifying what 
it means to be public. This Part undertakes that task, beginning by 
distinguishing the meaning of publicness in the context of corporate and 
securities law from its meanings in other, broader settings. This Part then 
traces a more nuanced understanding of publicness in recent scholarship on 
the classification of corporate entities and contends that adoption of a 
broader understanding of the concept is not merely appropriate in securities 
regulation, but is essential.   
A. Public Things 
It is an unfortunate accident that discussion of what it means to be 
public must confront the classification of a particular corporate form. To be 
public in the context of corporate and securities law is to be described and 
defined by law. An entity designated as a “public company” is one in 
which ownership is widely distributed across the holders of its tradable 
shares.31 Status as a public company carries ongoing regulatory 
obligations, such as the filing of periodic reports intended to ensure that 
investors have adequate information to decide how to value and whether to 
purchase the company’s shares.32 The largest public companies, whose 
                                                                                                                          
30 See infra note 186 and accompanying text (describing regulatory changes to permit public 
pension funds to invest in private offerings). 
31 Public Companies, INVESTOR.GOV, http://investor.gov/introduction-markets/how-markets-work 
/public-companies#.VMpfMcaOKgc [http://perma.cc/3HXK-E3ST] (last visited Sept. 29, 2015). 
32 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012). 
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aggregate shares may exceed some nations’ gross domestic product, exist 
in a media spotlight, and their corporate conduct can have outsize effects 
on the world economy, as well as on the members of the public. 
Attention to the largest companies makes sense given other aspects of 
the definition of “public.” Such public companies are prominent, well-
known, observed. They are also accessible,33 because not only is ownership 
open to any investor willing to pay the market price, but also because 
disclosure requirements impose a degree of transparency on the entity. By 
law, public companies provide details of their governance and financial 
well-being.  
When Congress approved the legislative framework that still shapes 
modern financial markets in the years after the Great Depression, 
lawmakers understood all too well the public consequences of investor 
conduct previously performed beyond the reach of federal law. The 
consequences of investor mistakes and misconduct “spell[ed] tragedy in 
the lives of thousands of individuals who invested their life savings, 
accumulated after years of effort”34 and prompted the adoption of the 
Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”).35 The Securities Act sought to 
protect investors by ensuring adequate disclosure of information relevant 
to the valuation of a security offered for sale, in order to promote capital 
formation for the growth of business and restore confidence in financial 
markets.36 However, the Securities Act exempted transactions from its 
registration requirement and formal disclosure regime “where the public 
benefits are too remote.”37 The 2008 crisis has shown that private offerings 
are closer to the public than was previously believed.38 
Unfortunately, perhaps because the landmark Securities Act and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 193439 (“Exchange Act”) defined what it 
means to be a public company, there has been little subsequent sustained 
legislative and regulatory attention to the question of whether and under 
what circumstances conduct that could be viewed as private should be 
understood as public. Rather, consideration of the question has typically 
occurred in reaction to a crisis and has focused on the proper steps the 
government should take to avert a similar disaster in the future. The result 
                                                                                                                          
33 The definition is instructive. The first definition offered by one dictionary is “exposed to 
general view,” and the second is “of, relating to, or affecting all the people or the whole area of a nation 
or state.” Definition of “Public”, MERRIAM-WEBSTER UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam 
-webster.com/dictionary/public [http://perma.cc/3JN6-6WHB] (last visited Sept. 14, 2015). 
34 H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933). 
35 Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012)). 
36 H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 1–2 (1933). 
37  Id. at 5. 
38 See infra note 108 and accompanying text (describing the impact of the financial crisis on 
public pension funds). 
39 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012). 
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has been the adoption of new laws and regulations seeking to correct 
perceived failures by specific individuals and entities—commercial or 
investment banks, for example—to consider the very public, social harms 
they caused. But such policy responses have not tackled the underlying 
question of the proper meaning of the term “public.” 
For example, in the wake of a series of corporate scandals involving 
prominent publicly traded companies like Enron and WorldCom, Congress 
approved the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.40 That law, informed by the 
accounting and governance improprieties at some of the nation’s largest 
companies, imposed new reporting and management requirements on 
public companies and created a new agency, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board, as an overseer.41 A few years later, in the 
wake of a financial crisis that pushed the nation as close as it has come to 
the Great Depression, Congress acted again, this time approving the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.42 Informed by 
revelations of poor investment oversight and excessive risk-taking by some 
of the nation’s largest companies, the law imposed additional governance 
requirements on public companies and required additional disclosures.   
The more abstract question of when corporate and/or investor conduct 
should be understood as public unfortunately did not receive attention in 
the debates over either of these laws, which addressed specific, perceived 
shortcomings in the pre-crisis financial regulatory regime. As Professor 
Hillary A. Sale has observed, these laws represented incursions into 
previously unregulated aspects of corporate conduct not on a systematic 
basis and not as a result of a comprehensive analysis of the rationale 
underlying the federal role in financial markets, but rather because private 
actors failed in concrete and spectacular fashion to regulate specific aspects 
of their business or investment practices themselves.43 
B. Aspects of Publicness 
To be public has a much broader meaning in other contexts beyond 
financial regulation. The United States is a republic, a form whose name 
derives from the Latin phrase res publica, translated in its simplest terms 
as the “public thing.”44 Public connotes service to the community, perhaps 
to society at large, as well as community ownership and responsibility for 
                                                                                                                          
40 Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
41 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2012). 
42 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 
and 15 U.S.C.).  
43 Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012, 1022 (2013). 
44 Definition of “Res Publica”, MERRIAM-WEBSTER UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, http://www.merr 
iam-webster.com/dictionary/republic [http://perma.cc/942S-2TAX] (last visited Sept. 14, 2015). 
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whatever is public. Politicians speak of a “public trust,”45 students assert an 
interest in “public service,” and government entities, like municipal 
agencies responsible for the quality of streets or provision of subsidized 
housing, have titles that include the term.46 Thus to be public has particular 
meanings that reflect the use that the public thing serves. A public good, as 
an economist would define it, is one that benefits the community. It is this 
meaning of publicness, which captures the impact of corporate conduct on 
the community, that corporate and securities law scholars like Professor 
Sale,47 Donald E. Langevoort and Robert Thompson,48 and Lisa M. 
Fairfax,49 among others,50 have pondered lately in various ways. 
Interest in the potential public purposes of corporations has not been 
limited to the academy, however. The legislatures of several states have 
recently adopted laws making it possible for corporations, designated 
“benefit corporations,”51 to serve a public mission alongside the traditional 
goal of generating profits to benefit investors.52 These legislative 
developments in turn have drawn scholarly attention,53 although those 
writing on new legislation have not yet gone so far as to explore the public 
effects of conduct by private companies. 
The possibility of explicitly serving multiple constituencies created by 
new state laws opens up intriguing and difficult questions about how 
managers and directors of for-profit entities should weigh the impacts of 
corporate decisions on parties who are not investors.54 Efforts to answer 
                                                                                                                          
45 See, e.g., Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President on Procurement (Mar. 4, 
2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-Procurement-3/4/09/ 
[http://perma.cc/2VL2-P5RD] (describing a “fundamental public trust that we must uphold” by 
reforming federal government contracting procedures). 
46 For example, the City of Cambridge is served by the Department of Public Works, responsible 
for services including collection of recycling and trash. See CAMBRIDGE DEP’T PUB. WORKS, 
http://www.cambridgema.gov/TheWorks/ [http://perma.cc/P9V3-983R] (last visited Sept. 9, 2015). 
47 See Sale, supra note 43 (analyzing limits imposed by Congress on public company corporate 
governance). 
48 See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 29 (discussing a framework for classifying public 
companies). 
49 See Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of Directors’ 
Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 409, 414–24 (2002) (analyzing the implications and effects of conversions of previously 
publicly operated entities like hospitals and primary and secondary schools into private, for-profit 
corporations). 
50 For example, the concept of “publicness” was the subject of an extended discussion at a 
roundtable at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools annual meeting in 2014. 
51 For illustration, this is the designation used in California. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14610 (West 
2015). 
52 Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s Opting In?, 
14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 249 (2014). 
53 See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 49, at 426–30 (evaluating potential objections to corporate 
directors’ pursuit of goals beyond shareholder wealth maximization). 
54  Id. at 440–42. 
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such questions should force a discussion of what the possible effects of 
corporate and/or investment conduct are, and hopefully of proper methods 
of evaluating and responding to those effects. The “public” effects of 
business activities must be identified in order to determine where the costs 
of any social harms should be allocated. For example, if a company 
pollutes the environment, the cost must be recognized before it can be 
assigned or reassigned.55 Similarly, if investment decisions have public 
effects, the costs of bad decisions must be recognized before they can be 
assigned or reassigned, or ideally, before policies can be adopted to reduce 
their likelihood in the first place.56 
Business and securities law scholars writing about publicness have 
generally not allowed the term to encompass so much. Rather, scholars 
including Professors Langevoort and Thompson have focused on the 
proper determination of when a company should be classified as public, 
meaning that the corporation should be subject to the greater disclosure 
requirements imposed by federal law.57 Policy and technology changes that 
permit companies to access capital without offering shares through a public 
offering make efforts to police the border between public and private, as 
the terms have been used in the securities law context, more difficult and 
perhaps less relevant. At the same time, the traditional regulatory regime 
classifying companies does not distinguish on the basis of “societal 
footprint”58—a concept that is consistent with the much broader notion of 
what it means to be public, that this Article argues for, and that Professors 
Langevoort and Thompson treat as relevant to the determination of when 
greater disclosure requirements should be imposed.59 
Others have characterized greater regulation of corporate conduct as 
extending the reach of the regulatory regime applicable to companies. In 
this view, greater publicness is the analogue of privatization: when 
corporate decision-making is subject to greater regulatory and legislative 
constraints, the shift constitutes an extension of public power into a 
                                                                                                                          
55 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, From Green to Global: Toward the Transformation of International 
Environmental Law, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 258 (1995) (discussing analysis of the failure to 
impose costs of environmental harm on consumers and producers in order to reduce such harm). 
56 See, e.g., David H. Webber, The Use and Abuse of Labor’s Capital, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2106, 
2168–69 (2014) (arguing that fiduciary duties of officers and directors, properly understood, should 
preclude pension funds from making investments that could lead to loss of beneficiaries’ jobs). 
57 Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 29, at 341. 
58 Id. at 342. 
59 This Article, in contrast, argues that what Professors Langevoort and Thompson might view as 
the societal footprint should both encompass the purpose for which a private entity acts and potentially 
justify the imposition of constraints on that entity’s conduct. The requirements this Article suggests 
could be imposed on institutional investors, for example, go well beyond imposition of reporting 
requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012)). 
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previously private sphere.60 The removal of officer and director discretion  
by legislative fiat was the response to scandals involving corporate 
conduct, after the financial accounting scandals in 2001–2002: Congress 
imposed requirements on public company boards, mandating that members 
of the auditing committee be independent, for example.61 After the 
financial crisis of 2008, lawmakers imposed the requirement that 
companies seize, or claw back, payments made to executives on the basis 
of corporate financial performance based on spurious data.62 In each case, 
the government removed corporate officers’ and directors’ discretion. 
Scholars who have focused on corporate governance have addressed 
the question of the extent to which stakeholders other than shareholders 
should weigh in on decision-making by corporate officers and directors.63 
Professor Lynn A. Stout has persuasively argued that one rationale for the 
power of corporate boards relative to shareholders is enabling the 
corporation to serve multiple constituencies, beyond holders of its stock, in 
order to serve best the needs of the entity.64 Professor Stout argues that 
more than investment by shareholders is necessary to make a corporation 
succeed, noting that creditors must have faith in corporate decision-
making, as must employees, vendors, and customers.65 Shareholders in 
myopic pursuit of short-run profit might well indulge in choices that would 
disserve necessary constituencies. From a broader perspective, 
shareholders might oppose—and in one venerable and widely taught case, 
they did oppose—corporate philanthropy.66 Acknowledging that the 
interests of various public corporation stakeholders should be weighed 
when evaluating corporate governance regimes is only a small step from 
acknowledging that achievement of public missions should also factor in 
analysis and regulation of corporate conduct.  
Professor Lisa M. Fairfax addresses precisely the question of the 
authority of corporate directors to act on the basis of concerns about 
constituents other than shareholders, and concludes that corporate law does 
                                                                                                                          
60 See Sale, supra note 43, at 1019 (distinguishing between the indirect government influence of 
the past and the mandatory duties and decision-making responsibilities imposed on corporate officers 
and directors by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
61 See 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2012). 
62 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4 (2012). 
63 See, e.g., Peter C. Kostant, Team Production and the Progressive Corporate Law Agenda, 35 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 668–69 (2002); Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical 
Evidence on Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 
667, 680–81 (2003). 
64 Stout, supra note 63, at 680. 
65 See id. at 680–84 (developing an example of how corporate stakeholders other than 
shareholders might behave in the presence and absence of constraints on shareholder conduct).  
66 See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 590 (N.J. 1953) (holding that a shareholder 
could not challenge a philanthropic donation by corporation to Princeton University). 
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afford them the flexibility to do so.67 Her analysis may assuage critics 
philosophically opposed to privatization, who argue that the public mission 
of privatized businesses will be compromised by the pursuit of profit.68 
While Professor Fairfax’s question of whether profit maximization can be 
consistent with achievement of public goals is related to the argument of 
this Article, her focus was on the possibility that the interests of 
shareholders and the public might diverge.69 This Article is motivated by 
concern that institutional investors serving public goals might make 
mistakes. 
There are profound ramifications to recognition that ostensibly for-
profit legal entities like corporations can and do serve missions properly 
conceived of as public.70 This Article of necessity seeks only to highlight 
the challenge created by the continued blurring of the line dividing public 
from private. The discussion that follows analyzes the implications and 
offers a policy response in just one area, involving the availability of the 
private offering exemption to disclosure requirements imposed by federal 
law on public offerings of securities. But the focus of the Article is not 
meant to suggest that the implications of adopting a broader definition of 
publicness do not extend much further. 
III.  PRIVATE OFFERINGS: THE FRAMEWORK AND ITS PROBLEMS 
The federal securities laws adopted in the wake of the market crash of 
1929 focused primarily on the protection of investors. However, 
lawmakers and, subsequently, courts have long accepted that not all 
investors are equally in need of assistance.71 Certain investors, those 
perceived as having the ability to protect themselves, may purchase 
securities that have not been registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC); the registration requirement is deemed unnecessary. 
This exemption regime, classifying investors based on wealth, limits 
participation in potentially riskier transactions only to the extent that the 
presumption that investor wealth correlates with sophistication holds true.72 
                                                                                                                          
67 See Fairfax, supra note 49, at 473–74 (concluding that because the flexibility and 
permissiveness of corporate law allows directors the freedom to pursue the interests of non-
shareholders, the social entity conception of the corporation has taken precedence over the shareholder 
primacy model). 
68 See id. at 428 & n.93. 
69 See id. at 429–30. 
70 For example, insurance companies, whose policies benefit third parties, invest in order to help 
fund their operations. To the extent that the availability of policies to beneficiaries is a public goal, 
enhanced regulation of insurer investment activity could be consistent with the arguments made in this 
Article about public pension funds. However, such a proposal is beyond this Article’s scope. 
71 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124–25 (1953) (“An offering to those who are shown 
to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction ‘not involving any public offering.’”). 
72 The problem of the unsophisticated but wealthy person is addressed in colorful fashion in a 
student note describing, among other things, how the regulations would treat the heiress Paris Hilton. 
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This Part summarizes the different exceptions to the general requirement 
that securities be registered, analyzes criticisms of the exemption regime, 
and explains why its shortcomings matter. 
A. When Securities Need Not Be Registered 
Section 5 of the Securities Act prohibits sale of a security unless that 
security is registered with the SEC.73 However, issuers may sell securities 
that have not been registered pursuant to one of several possible 
exemptions, or “safe harbors.” Private offerings typically take advantage of 
exemptions described in Section 4(2) of the Securities Act, the rules under 
Regulation D (the most important of which draws its authority from 
Section 4(2)),74 Rule 144A,75 and Regulation S.76 Each exemption regime 
is described in brief below. 
1.  Section 4(2) of the Securities Act 
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act exempts from the registration 
requirement of Section 5 any transaction “by an issuer not involving any 
public offering.”77 Thus, an issuer can sell an unregistered security to a 
buyer, so long as the sale does not constitute a public offering. The 
Supreme Court has reasoned that if the rationale for the Securities Act’s 
registration requirement generally is “protect[ion] of investors by 
promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed 
investment decisions,” then the “natural” justification of the exemption is 
that the participants are investors “who are shown to be able to fend for 
themselves.”78    
Lower courts attempting to discern whether a securities transaction 
constitutes a public offering have focused on aspects of the offering 
including the number of offerees, their relationship to each other and the 
issuer, the number of units (such as shares) offered, the manner in which 
they were offered, and the sophistication of the offerees.79 The more people 
to whom the security is offered, the greater the number of securities sold, 
                                                                                                                          
Wallis K. Finger, Note, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s “Accredited Investor” 
Definition Under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733, 733 (2009). 
73 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 5(a), 48 Stat. 74, 77 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77e 
(2012)). 
74 Id. § 4(2), 48 Stat. at 77. 
75 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2014).  
76 Id. §§ 230.901–.905.  
77 Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 48 Stat. at 77. 
78 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124–25 (1953). Interestingly, in this oft-quoted case, 
the Court implied that an evaluation of a potential purchaser’s need for protection turned not on 
characteristics of that investor, but on the nature of the information provided by the seller. Id. at 127.   
79 SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 644 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Doran v. Petrol. Mgmt. Corp., 545 
F.2d 893, 905 (5th Cir. 1977) (applying a slightly different set of factors).   
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the more broadly accessible the transaction is (i.e., the more widely 
distributed the issuer-disseminated information about the transaction), and 
the less sophisticated the potential purchasers, the more likely the 
transaction is to be deemed public and consequently not eligible for the 
exemption. Cases generally do not, however, explore the rationale for 
presumption of sophistication in more detail than the Supreme Court did 
initially, nor do they ponder whether there are other reasons beyond the 
statutory text to permit or deny an investor from participating in a private 
offering. 
2.  Regulation D:  Rules 504, 505, and 506 
Regulation D, through three implementing rules, provides other often-
used paths around registration. Rule 504, which draws on authority granted 
by Section 3 of the Securities Act,80 exempts sales of securities by issuers 
offering and selling securities worth no more than $1 million in a twelve-
month period.81 Rule 505, which also draws on Section 3, exempts sales of 
securities provided that the aggregate offering price does not exceed $5 
million.82 Rule 506, which draws its authority from Section 4(2) of the 
Securities Act,83 imposes no limit on the amount of money that can be 
raised through a private offering, but does limit the offering to “accredited 
investors” and no more than thirty-five sophisticated investors that are not 
accredited.84 Because it does not include a dollar limit, Rule 506 is 
particularly appealing to issuers. 
The exemptions do not mean that issuers are free of any obligation to 
provide information to any prospective investor. In fact, issuers are 
required to provide information like that required in a registration 
statement, with a level of detail that increases as the value of the offering 
rises, to investors that are not accredited.85 The securities sold through any 
of these safe harbors are “restricted,” meaning that resale by the purchaser 
is prohibited unless the security is registered or the subsequent transaction 
is independently exempt from registration requirements.86 
Accredited investors, according to Section 3(a) of the Securities Act, 
                                                                                                                          
80 Section 3(b) permits the SEC to use its regulatory power to add to the Act’s list of exempt 
securities “by reason of the small amount involved or the limited character of the public offering.” 
However, no issue may be exempt if the aggregate amount of securities offered is greater than $5 
million. Id. 
81 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2014). The exemption is limited to issuers that are not subject to reporting 
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, that are not investment companies, and that are 
not “development stage compan[ies]” that do not have a specific business plan or that have a business 
plan “to engage in a merger or acquisition with an unidentified company or companies.” Id.  
82 Id. § 230.505.  
83 See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the scope of Section 4(2)).  
84 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2014).  
85 Id. § 230.502(b).  
86 See infra Part III.A.3 (describing regulations limiting resale of unregistered securities). 
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include banks, savings and loan associations, investment companies, 
executives of the issuer, individuals whose net worth exceeds $1 million or 
whose income exceeded $200,000 in each of the two most recent years, or 
trusts and state benefit plans with assets of more than $5 million.87 A 
sophisticated investor “has such knowledge and experience in financial and 
business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the 
prospective investment.”88 These clear and concrete criteria have the 
benefit of easy administration, but presume a correlation between ability 
and wealth. 
Sellers serving these accredited and/or sophisticated investors avoid a 
regulatory burden; buyers in turn are expected to be sufficiently savvy to 
ask for disclosure of the information they deem relevant to making their 
investment decision. Use of quantifiable investor characteristics has the 
advantage of simple application, because determining wealth or corporate 
form is relatively straightforward, but this Article argues that these criteria 
are not up to the task. 
3.  Rules 144 and 144A 
The above exemptions apply to initial offerings of securities made by 
an issuer to buyers participating in a private offering.89 Separate 
restrictions and exemptions apply to resale of securities initially purchased 
by accredited or sophisticated investors.90 This complementary regime 
prevents initial purchasers from serving as conduits for the sale of 
securities on public secondary markets, such as stock exchanges. Under 
Rule 144, securities acquired in a transaction that did not involve a public 
offering may not be resold for six months if the issuer is a publicly traded 
company and for one year if the issuer is not a publicly traded company.91 
Even after this holding period has expired, such “restricted securities”92 
may not be sold to the general public unless specific, additional 
                                                                                                                          
87 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2014). The list above is not exhaustive. In calculating the net worth of 
an individual investor, the rule requires exclusion of the value of that individual’s residence. Id. 
§ 230.501(a)(5).  
88 Id. § 230.506(b)(ii).  
89 Id. § 230.506(a). 
90 Id. § 230.144A(d)(1). 
91 Id. § 230.144(d)(1). The shorter restriction applies if the issuer has been subject to the periodic 
reporting requirements of the Exchange Act for at least ninety days prior to the initial sale; the longer 
restriction applies if the issuer has not been subject to the reporting requirements for at least ninety days 
prior to the sale. Id. The intuition is, if the issuer discloses financial information in its periodic reports, 
then the potential buyer of the restricted securities is more likely to be able to evaluate the value and 
riskiness of the securities.  
92 Id. § 230.144(a)(3).  
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requirements have been met.93 
Rule 144A provides an exemption for sales of restricted securities 
“acquired directly or indirectly from the issuer, or from an affiliate of the 
issuer, in a transaction or chain of transactions not involving any public 
offering.”94 The holder of such securities may sell to a “qualified 
institutional buyer” (QIB), a category which is not the same as an 
accredited investor.95 QIBs include insurance companies, investment 
companies, and employee benefit plans, provided that the entity “owns and 
invests on a discretionary basis at least $100 million in securities of issuers 
that are not affiliated with the entity.”96 Because of this asset requirement, 
QIBs invariably are accredited investors, but the converse is not true.  
Like the standards applicable to accredited investors, the QIB 
requirements are easy to apply, focused as they are on a relatively 
straightforward valuation of an institutional investor’s assets. The QIB 
requirements differ in that a presumption of sophistication based on control 
of $100 million of securities may seem safer than a presumption based on 
the wealth thresholds applicable to accredited investors; the QIB 
requirement is more likely to narrow the field to investors that have 
significant investment experience.97  
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, the SEC modified Rule 506 
and Rule 144A in 2013 to implement a provision of legislation intended to 
bolster economic growth.98 The changes permit an issuer of securities 
through a private placement or a seller of securities purchased through a 
private placement, respectively, to engage in general advertising and 
general solicitation of potential purchasers, provided that purchasers are 
accredited investors and that the other requirements of the rule are met.99 
The amendment did not change the method of classifying investors as 
“accredited,” nor did it include criteria for determining definitively 
whether a non-accredited investor was sufficiently sophisticated to 
participate. However, the amendment did provide guidance to issuers or 
sellers trying to take advantage of the safe harbor, to help avoid reaching 
                                                                                                                          
93 Rule 144: Selling Restricted and Control Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/rule144.htm [http://perma.cc/HK4F-JNXJ] (last visited Nov. 29, 
2015). 
94 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3).  
95 Id. § 230.144A.  
96 Id. § 230.144A(a)(i). This list is a subset, not a comprehensive list, of the entities that qualify as 
QIBs.   
97 The rationale behind the $100 million requirement, as opposed to $50 million, for example, is 
unclear. Either way, the requirement clearly would exclude far more investors than the accredited 
investor criteria do. 
98 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a), 126 Stat. 306, 313–14 
(2012) (mandating SEC action).   
99 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(c)(2)(ii), 230.144A(d)(1) (2014). 
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an erroneous conclusion that a purchaser was accredited.100 These criteria 
are relevant for this Article because they describe various ways that a seller 
can safely evaluate buyer sophistication.  
The amended rule suggests that an issuer seeking to verify that a 
potential purchaser is an accredited investor consult Internal Revenue 
Service forms showing income,101 bank statements, reports of credit rating 
agencies, or written statements from brokers, investment advisers, lawyers, 
or accountants who have worked with the investor.102 Unfortunately, these 
criteria103 do not signal a shift away from simple, mechanical tests 
measuring easily observable investor characteristics that may be unreliable 
proxies for sophistication. The amended rule still relies on measures of net 
worth, rather than some evaluation of investor experience, skill, or 
resilience, as advocated in this Article. This persistent reliance on assets as 
an indicator of ability represents a dangerous continuation of an outdated 
mode of thinking about investors, as demonstrated in Part IV below. 
4.  Regulation S: Rules 901–905 
Under Regulation S, offerings and sales of securities outside the 
United States are not subject to the registration requirements of Section 5 
of the Securities Act.104 The rule provides safe harbors for offers and sales 
of securities in specific transactions, all subject to two general conditions:  
(1) the offer and sale must occur in an “offshore transaction,”105 meaning 
that either the seller believes the buyer is offshore when the sale is 
consummated, or that the sale takes place on one of several, specifically 
identified offshore exchanges; and (2) the offer and sale are not the subject 
of “directed selling efforts,” defined as “any activity undertaken for the 
purpose of, or that could reasonably be expected to have the effect of, 
conditioning the market in the United States for any of the securities being 
offered in reliance on . . . Regulation S.”106 In this context, “conditioning 
the market” refers to efforts to drum up interest in the offering and sales 
opportunity by, for example, mailing materials to potential investors.107    
Because the eligibility for this exemption from the registration 
                                                                                                                          
100 Id. 
101 The issuer is also advised to procure a statement from the purchaser indicating that the 
purchaser anticipates future income sufficient to qualify as an accredited investor in the current year. 
Id. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(A). 
102  Id. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(B)–(C). 
103 The SEC is careful not to require consideration of any or all of the factors listed in the 
amended rule; the methods listed “are examples of the types of non-exclusive and non-mandatory 
methods that satisfy the verification requirement.” Id. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(D). 
104 Id. § 230.901. 
105 Id. § 230.903(a)(1). 
106 Id. § 230.902(c). 
107 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 221–23 (5th ed. 
2004).  
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requirements of the Securities Act does not turn on investor characteristics 
but on geography, this Article will not spend more time evaluating it. 
B. Concerns over Private Offerings 
Private offerings represent a fast-growing share of securities offerings. 
In recent years, the amount of capital raised by private offerings of 
securities has exceeded the amount raised through public offerings: in 
2010, according to one study, offerings of public company stock raised 
slightly more than $200 billion, while the value of securities sold through 
private offerings was about four times greater.108 The bulk of losses 
suffered by pension funds in the wake of the financial crisis were the result 
of declines in stock prices,109 but securities purchased in private offerings 
resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars in losses, including losses to 
public pension funds estimated at one point to exceed 25% of total assets 
between 2007 and early 2009.110 Blame for the declines in asset values 
cannot be laid entirely or even mostly on investments in “alternative 
investments” including hedge funds and private equity. But one report 
estimated that these investments accounted for 7% of total assets in a 
typical pension portfolio, so they do bear some responsibility.111 From 
October 2007 through March 2009, declines in the value of these 
investments accounted for a decline in total asset value of slightly less than 
2%.112 In contrast, declines in stock prices, bonds, and loans, which 
combined accounted for 85% of the typical pension portfolio, resulted in a 
34% decline in asset value.113 Improving financial markets in subsequent 
years may have helped pension funds recover some of that asset value, but 
that is not the end of the issue; pension funds need not only to avoid losses 
but also to grow in order to keep up with rising costs.114 Consequently, the 
shortcomings of the exemption regime matter and will matter more as 
pension funds purchase more of these alternative investments. This Part 
provides a critique of that regime. 
Investor decisions in the years leading up to the financial crisis of 
                                                                                                                          
108 U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 
UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS USING THE REGULATION D EXEMPTION 3 fig.3 (2012), http://www.sec.gov/ 
info/smallbus/acsec/acsec103111_analysis-reg-d-offering.pdf [http://perma.cc/2X6N-5RCN]. 
109 DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, BROOKINGS INST., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS’ EFFECTS ON THE 
ALTERNATIVES FOR PUBLIC PENSIONS 2 (2010), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/ 
papers/2010/4/20-public-pensions-elliott/0420_public_pensions_elliott.pdf [http://perma.cc/8GRU-
GWX2]. 
110 Id. at 1. 
111 Id. at 2 tbl.1. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 2 (“The public pension funds may have lost 15% over two years on a ‘nominal’ basis, 
but, if their target return was 8% a year, they lost 31% compared to their targeted level of investment 
value, excluding the effects of contributions and pension payments.” (footnote omitted)). 
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2008115 call into question the presumption that wealth correlates with 
sophistication.116 Sizable institutional investors often purchased securities 
in private offerings and in many cases did not take appropriate or adequate 
steps to protect themselves.117 Indeed, the crisis revealed just how many 
institutions previously considered astute navigators of financial markets 
were in fact capable of remarkably poor judgments.118 According to the 
report of the commission tasked by Congress with identifying the causes of 
the crisis, purchasers of doomed mortgage-linked securities119 who were 
“qualified institutional buyer[s]” under SEC rules120 “included investors as 
diverse as insurance companies like MetLife, pension funds like the 
                                                                                                                          
115 Investor decisions a decade earlier, during the technology bubble that led into the new 
millennium, also raise questions. 
116 Government investigations into investments by public pension funds in alternative investments 
have found shortcomings in institutions’ procedures and recommended that the government provide 
guidance for future transactions with private equity and hedge funds. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HIGHLIGHT CHALLENGES OF 
HEDGE FUND AND PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING 9, 15–17 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/5886 
23.pdf [http://perma.cc/5VX2-BGUA] (finding that while most of the fund executives interviewed 
expressed satisfaction with the performance of their alternative investments, they also described 
challenges in the form of illiquid investments, limited transparency, and adverse effects of co-investors’ 
withdrawals). Public pension funds with tens of millions of dollars to invest may suffer losses on 
transactions into which they were enticed by misconduct, as well. See, e.g., SEC Charges Manhattan-
Based Private Equity Manager with Stealing $9 Million in Investor Funds, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMM’N (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540703682 
#.VMKxg8aOKgc [http://perma.cc/8ESR-W5RU] (describing the SEC’s complaint against a private 
equity fund manager who essentially used for improper purposes funds invested by pensions and other 
investors); SEC Charges Private Equity Firm and Money Manager for Defrauding Detroit-Area Public 
Pension Funds, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N (Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
litreleases/2010/lr21500.htm [http://perma.cc/4JL6-NHT8] (describing a complaint by the SEC that 
alleged deception of three public pension funds in Michigan). 
117 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, created by Congress to look into the causes of the 
financial crisis that began in 2008, concluded that “financial institutions made, bought, and sold 
mortgage securities they never examined, did not care to examine, or knew to be defective.” NAT’L 
COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. & ECON. CRISIS IN THE U.S., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT xvii (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT], http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-
FCIC.pdf [http://perma.cc/CTK8-XA9X]. 
118 See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 29, at 362–63 (examining how institutional buyers 
willingly purchased so much risk). 
119 FCIC REPORT, supra note 117, at 169–70. Specifically at issue were collateralized debt 
obligations, or CDOs, which are securities whose value depends on the performance of a bundle of 
home loans. 
120 While Regulation D applied to sales of securities by the issuer, sales of collateralized debt 
obligations implicated in the financial crisis often were subject to Rule 144A. Id. at 170. This 
regulation permits sales of certain securities to “qualified institutional buyers.” Id. Various types of 
entities, such as investment companies, insurance companies, small business investment companies, 
employee benefit plans, and trust funds, can be QIBs, provided that they “in the aggregate own[] and 
invest[] on a discretionary basis at least $100 million in securities of issuers that are not affiliated with 
the [investing] entity.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1)(i) (2014). Rule 144A applies to resale of existing 
securities. FCIC REPORT, supra note 117, at 170. The advantage of 144A transactions is exemption 
from SEC registration requirements; these transactions were not considered public offerings. Id. 
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California State Teachers’ Retirement System, and investment banks like 
Goldman Sachs.”121   
Even municipalities with tens of millions of dollars to invest might not 
properly investigate a transaction before entering it.122 Financial 
companies, despite decades of experience selling insurance against all 
manner of catastrophes, might fail to prepare for the possibility that they 
might have to pay on guarantees of complex financial transactions.123 
Companies whose job it is to evaluate the worth of complex securities 
might fail, for whatever reason, to do so.124 The failure to study an 
investment adequately ahead of time may have been the result either of an 
influx of investors inexperienced in the world of asset-backed securities, of 
weak incentives to avoid risk, or of inadequate internal controls within 
investing institutions. Whatever the cause, the result was investment in 
securities tied in various ways to real-estate debt by buyers whose wealth 
suggested sophistication but whose conduct revealed a dangerous 
combination of arrogance, greed, recklessness, and, above all, naiveté.125 
If investors that meet the regulatory requirements do not in fact have 
the capacity to evaluate the riskiness of transactions ahead of time or the 
resources to withstand losses if adverse risks materialize, then the 
exemption regime is not an effective screening device. The current 
structure, based on eighty-five-year-old beliefs about investor 
sophistication and wealth, does not take into account what history has 
made evident: investors who satisfy the criteria often do not deserve the 
presumption.126 The exemption regime does not screen institutions that, 
though they manage large amounts of money, may not be sophisticated. 
Nor does the regulatory regime effectively screen investors that do not take 
advantage of their capacity to evaluate a deal even though they have it.   
Scholars have begun to investigate how investment decisions are made 
in an institutional setting, in part to understand how mistakes happen. They 
have identified factors, from compensation structures to group dynamics to 
                                                                                                                          
121 FCIC REPORT, supra note 117, at 170 (footnote omitted).    
122 E.g., Terra Sec. ASA Konkursbo v. Citigroup, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 441, 443–44 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (illustrating one example of insufficient pre-investment research in a case in which Norwegian 
municipalities alleged common-law fraud and violations of federal securities laws after investing 
disastrously in notes sold by the defendants). 
123 E.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 117, at 140–41 (outlining a lead example of this lack of 
preparation in AIG’s credit default swap business prior to the 2008 crisis). 
124 Id. at 212. 
125 Id. at xvii. 
126 Given the relatively small amount of money an individual must have in order to qualify as an 
accredited investor, it is correspondingly likely that an individual investor that barely satisfies the 
requirement lacks the resources to perform due diligence on a complex securities transaction. The less 
wealthy an individual investor, of course, the more likely that investor is to invest through an 
intermediary, and the less likely it is that the investor would be approached by a seller offering a 
complex security through private offering. 
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heuristics relied upon by individual executives, that may get in the way of 
sophisticated conduct.127 Institutions, like individuals, are subject to 
pressures and biases that may result in poor investment decisions and/or 
poor implementation of investment decisions. Institutions may not conduct 
thorough due diligence on securities, for example, when executives leading 
them are motivated by a desire to keep up with rivals buying the same 
instruments. These findings matter because institutional investors have 
come to dominate securities markets;128 fewer individual investors 
purchase securities directly at the retail level.129     
The regulatory regime that classifies investors as sophisticated also 
fails to take into account the increasingly complex securities bought and 
sold on financial markets. Transactions have become harder to classify, 
with private offerings that function like public offerings130and public 
company stock sales that look like private placements.131 As financial 
instruments have become more intricate, understanding their structure and 
potential effects has grown more difficult; sellers of securities implicated 
in the financial crisis of 2008 commented dismissively time and again on 
the ability of purchasers to figure out what they were buying.132 Yet the 
regulations defining accredited investors do not take into account the 
difficulty of understanding the consequences of a particular investment and 
do not, for example, specify some level of expertise buyers must 
demonstrate, let alone require them to weigh the potential effects of poor 
decisions. 
Institutional relationships are also increasingly complex, with 
intermediaries investing in private offerings directly, or in hedge funds or 
                                                                                                                          
127 See Steven M. Davidoff & Caire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 599, 
610 (2013); Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in 
Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 818 
(2010).  
128 Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, Institutional Investors: Power and 
Responsibility, Remarks at Georgia State University (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/ 
Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515808 [http://perma.cc/FFN6-AKW2] (“[T]he proportion of U.S. 
public equities managed by institutions has risen steadily over the past six decades, from about 7 or 8% 
of market capitalization in 1950, to about 67% in 2010.”). 
129 Davidoff, supra note 22, at 340 (identifying “the trend of investment intermediation and 
deretailization” as a significant development in the new capital market). 
130 For example, Goldman Sachs’ pre-public-offering investment of $500 million in Facebook. 
Susanne Craig & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Goldman Offering Clients a Chance to Invest in Facebook, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2011, 12:42 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/goldman-invests-in-
facebook-at-50-billion-valuation/. 
131 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 211, 220 (2009). 
132 E.g., Dodona I, LLC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 847 F. Supp. 2d 624, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(describing an e-mail in which a Goldman-Sachs’ employee laments a client’s ability to understand a 
transaction); FCIC REPORT, supra note 117, at 235–36 (describing efforts by a Goldman Sachs’ vice 
president to encourage sales of securities to buyers other than “sophisticated hedge funds”). 
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private equity funds on behalf of retail savers, such as workers trying to 
prepare for retirement.133 Such investment patterns make regulating 
investor conduct more difficult; investors can do indirectly what they 
cannot do directly. Prohibitions in such a market will not prevent 
misconduct, they will simply force innovation.134 These relationships 
among institutions, for example between pension funds and hedge funds in 
which they invest,135 also serve to blur the distinction between entities 
classified as public for securities law purposes and those classified as 
private.136 Hedge funds and private equity funds are major players on 
public exchanges and, more importantly for this Article, institutions 
serving the unsophisticated public increasingly invest in private offerings 
and in hedge funds and private equity funds that invest in private 
offerings.137 Private offerings by definition do not face the same disclosure 
requirements as public offerings, thereby limiting the SEC’s ability to 
monitor. 
Nor does the exemption regime take into account more intangible 
characteristics that suggest sophistication. There are other ways investors 
are classified, informally but significantly. The decisions of some investors 
have powerful effects on financial markets, even if the size of the 
investment is modest for that investor; when the legendary investor Warren 
Buffett put $5 billion into Goldman Sachs early in the fall of 2008, his 
move was reassuring to financial markets.138 Buffett’s influence is certainly 
related to his wealth, but that alone does not (and should not) account for 
the respect given him. He is also a longtime investor who has made astute 
choices over time, and investors who are repeat players, who conduct 
                                                                                                                          
133 Davidoff, supra note 22, at 352. 
134 See id. at 355 (pointing out the delay between the comparatively slow regulatory process’ 
response to investors’ adaptation to new regulations). 
135 The nation’s largest public pension funds hold slightly more than fifteen percent of their assets 
in “alternative” investments that primarily consist of private equity and hedge funds. Summary of 
Findings for FY 2013, PUB. FUND SURV. (Jan. 2015), http://www.publicfundsurvey.org/publicfund 
survey/summaryoffindings.html [http://perma.cc/F99X-GVS8]. The Public Fund Survey reflects data 
on state and local government retirement systems overseeing $2.86 trillion. Id. Public pension funds 
hold more than $4 trillion in assets. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, 
Evaluating Pension Fund Investments Through the Lens of Good Corporate Governance, Remarks at 
the Hispanic Heritage Foundation’s Latinos on Fast Track Investors Forum (June 27, 2014), http:// 
www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542193403#_edn1 [http://perma.cc/8DTW-86Z5]. 
136 Cary Martin, Private Investment Companies in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Rethinking 
the Effectiveness of the Sophisticated Investor Exemption, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 49, 76 (2012). 
137 See supra note 135 (describing the extent of public pension fund investment in alternative 
investments, including private equity and hedge funds); see also Steve Eder et al., Pensions Leap Back 
to Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J. (May 27, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230365 
4804576347762838825864 (reporting on public pension funds’ shift to private equity and hedge fund 
investments a few years after the 2008 financial crisis). 
138 See Andew Bary, Warren Buffett Makes an Offer Goldman Sachs Can’t Refuse, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 28, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122256922970483051. 
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similar transactions repeatedly, have more expertise than those whose 
transactions are more sporadic or varied. The more prestige, for want of a 
better word, the investor amasses and the longer that investor’s track 
record of success, the more likely it is that the investor has access to 
transactions unavailable to other market participants. Of course, prestige 
presents certain challenges to quantification. 
Courts have at times noted the significance of the quality of advisers to 
investors. Large investors entering significant and complex transactions 
retain Wall Street law firms to counsel them on legal risks of a transaction, 
investment bankers to help structure and finance it, accounting firms to 
help verify asset values, and possibly even media advisers to shape the 
appearance of a deal to other investors, the news media, lawmakers, and 
regulators.139 One proposed reform would impose on broker-dealers 
stronger obligations to evaluate how appropriate an investment, including a 
private offering, would be in the context of the buyer’s current portfolio, 
thereby putting on the broker-dealer the burden of deciding whether a 
transaction is suitable for that investor.140 A now-classic article describing 
courts’ inconsistent evaluations of investor sophistication offers a 
theoretical framework for determining when sophistication should matter, 
and provides a list of investor characteristics that should figure in courts’ 
evaluations.141 
In a provocative article, Professor Stephen Choi proposes using a test 
to sort investors more directly.142 The test would require a would-be 
investor to demonstrate knowledge of the “function of different market 
participants, the risks they pose, and available investor protections.”143 
Performance on the test would enable an investor to participate in 
                                                                                                                          
139 Given their financial resources, such investors are likely to have access to sophisticated 
representation, should they choose to pursue recovery through litigation when a transaction is 
unsatisfactory. See Vijay Sekhon, Can the Rich Fend for Themselves?: Inconsistent Treatment of 
Wealthy Investors Under the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010, 7 HASTINGS 
BUS. L.J. 1, 7–8 (2011). 
140 Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified: The Lacunae in 
Contemporary Securities Regulation, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291, 314 (1994). The underlying concern 
expressed in the article is the risk of fraud against wealthy, unsophisticated individual investors, rather 
than the systemic risk posed by wealthy, unsophisticated financial entities. Id. at 317. 
141 See C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 
DUKE L.J. 1081, 1137–47 (1988) (describing five principles that should guide courts deciding when to 
take into account investor sophistication); id. at 1149–54 (providing an appendix listing investor 
characteristics potentially relevant to the assessment of sophistication). The list includes pragmatic and 
direct criteria such as investment experience, professional status, history of speculative investments, 
government or business experience, professional experience in the securities industry, as well as 
potentially more subjective criteria, such as education, intelligence, age and, indeed, wealth and 
income. Id. 
142 Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 
279, 311 (2000). 
143 Id.  
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transactions subject to more or less mandatory disclosure: the most 
sophisticated investors could invest in a private offering because such 
investors would be deemed capable of protecting themselves, while the 
least sophisticated investors would be limited to investing in intermediary 
institutions that possessed greater financial expertise.144 The advantage of 
such a regime, were it mandatory,145 is its focus on actual investor 
knowledge directly, not via a proxy like wealth. The disadvantage is the 
need to design tests, which take time to develop, and would inevitably be 
imperfect and could produce false positive and false negative results, as 
Professor Choi notes.146 And while a more direct regulatory scheme is 
appealing, it would not eliminate an investor’s incentive to take on 
excessive risk in pursuit of returns needed to meet its other financial 
obligations,147 nor solve the problems of mistake or misconduct.   
Even investors with great expertise make mistakes or suffer lapses in 
judgment, choosing to jump on bandwagons in a doomed caravan, as did 
buyers of mortgage-linked securities in the years leading up to the 2008 
financial crisis.148 Prior to the crisis, too many investors, even large, 
putatively sophisticated financial institutions, engaged in transactions, the 
outcomes of which contributed to systemic risk that undermined their 
ability to perform their public missions of, for example, funding workers’ 
retirements.149 These developments, which make concerns about growth in 
private placements150 more significant, postdate much151 of the scholarship 
analyzing and criticizing the classification regime permitting participation 
                                                                                                                          
144 Id.  
145 Professor Choi considers mandatory, voluntary, and hybrid licensing schemes in his article. Id. 
at 310–19. 
146 Id. at 312–13. More recently, the Investor Advisory Committee to the SEC, created by the 
Dodd-Frank Act, has recommended that the Commission consider adopting a test as one way to screen 
the sophisticated from the less so. RECOMMENDATION OF THE INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE: 
ACCREDITED INVESTOR DEFINITION 6–7 (2014) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATION OF THE INVESTOR 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE], http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/investment-
advisor-accredited-definition.pdf [http://perma.cc/SRW6-JYFJ]. 
147 For example, a public pension fund’s obligations to pay benefits. 
148 Which, to be clear and to be fair, occurred eight years after the publication of Professor Choi’s 
article. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 117, at 18 (reporting the sale of $1.3 trillion of mortgage-backed 
securities from the third-quarter of 2006 to the height of the 2008 financial crisis). 
149 At least one post-crisis article has addressed the treatment of sophisticated investors. See Cary 
Martin, Private Investment Companies in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Rethinking the 
Effectiveness of the Sophisticated Investor Exemption, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 49, 76 (2012). Professor 
Martin argues that “prominent institutions that qualify as sophisticated investors have indirectly 
exposed retail investors to unregulated investment schemes” because retail investors have entrusted 
their savings to the institutions and the institutions have in turn invested in private placements. Id. 
Professor Martin calls for greater disclosure by hedge funds, for example, to institutional investors 
serving retail workers, as well as for consolidation of regulatory agencies. Id. at 107–11. 
150 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
151 But see supra note 149. 
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in private placements.152  
Developing an effective classification regime to identify investors 
capable of participating in private placements should be part of any effort 
to prevent a repeat of the investment patterns that led to the crisis. Even if 
private offerings are made accessible to more investors, as at least one 
scholar has proposed,153 the characteristics of those investors should 
determine the nature and extent of such access. Some will require greater 
protection and others less. 
Nevertheless, screening alone will not avoid future calamity.154 
Ensuring that those individuals and entities investing in private placements 
have the true wherewithal to do so—that is, both the ability to evaluate the 
investment beforehand and to manage adverse outcomes should they 
materialize—would reduce risk to the financial system and to financial 
institutions, as well as to individual workers who rely on institutions155 to 
manage their money to fund retirement or education.   
Because these transactions take place off exchanges and may involve 
parties unfamiliar with their counterparties and/or buyers without mastery 
of the nuances of the transaction, there is room for efficiency enhancement 
by clarifying the capabilities of participants. Those costs now are borne by 
buyers that do not have adequate information or ability to analyze and 
manage information needed to evaluate a transaction, and that allocation 
may be less than ideal. If buyers know that the counterparties they deal 
with must meet meaningful and relevant criteria in order to invest in a 
transaction, that knowledge should reduce costs and facilitate 
consummation of the deal.156 Failure to adopt a more sophisticated 
classification regime preserves the risk that too many investors without 
appropriate resources will buy into transactions too complex or risky for 
them to handle, with possible collateral consequences extending well 
                                                                                                                          
152 See infra Part IV.A (discussing improved measures of investor sophistication). 
153 Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3393–94 
(2013). Unlike Professor Rodrigues, I view the financial crisis as an indicator that too many investors 
already had—and have—access to private transactions and that such access should be restricted. 
154 As Professor Smith points out in the context of the Bernie Madoff scandal, sophistication alone 
does not ensure diligence or caution. Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Exposes “The Myth of the 
Sophisticated Investor”, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 215, 255–56 (2010). 
155 For example, public pension funds with increasing frequency invest in private transactions.  
The California Public Employee Retirement System, CalPERS, invested $32 billion, or about ten 
percent of its portfolio, in private equity as of June 30, 2014. CALPERS, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL 
FINANCIAL REPORT 28 (2014), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/cafr-2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LA6U-NW5U]. Some of those private equity entities may in turn invest in publicly 
traded securities.  
156 This is an important point because tightening the criteria accredited investors must meet may 
at first sound like a highly paternalistic move. But the goal is not to put a stop to private placements—
far from it. The goal is to ensure that these transactions take place among investors with the expertise to 
participate in them, without creating excess risk to other market participants or the functioning of 
markets themselves. 
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beyond the parties involved. In the next Part, this Article offers proposals 
for reform. 
IV.  REFORMING THE REGISTRATION EXEMPTION REGIME 
The regime that relies on investor wealth to determine who may 
participate in private offerings has evident flaws, in that it approves such 
participation by individuals and institutions without adequate means of 
evaluating risk or coping with adverse outcomes. As suggested by some of 
the critics whose views were discussed above,157 wealth and/or income 
may be poor proxies for ability, resources, or experience. This Part first 
develops an alternative regime that would attempt to capture investor 
sophistication directly, rather than indirectly, using other investor 
characteristics. Then, significantly, this Part contends that even an 
improved measure of investor ability should be subordinated to 
consideration of the purpose of the investment, on the theory that some 
investments are too important to be put at risk because they serve critical, 
public ends. To illustrate how the proposed policy might work in practice, 
this Part then returns to the case of SDCERA and illustrates how the 
proposal would have applied to that public pension fund.  
The proposal is an outline only; there are critical points that should be 
subject to debate. For example, what kind of risk tolerance should 
institutions with public missions have? Can a federal entity like the SEC 
impose limits on the investor conduct of state public pension funds, in the 
context of the U.S. federal structure? This Article seeks to encourage 
debate over questions like these. 
A. Investor Characteristics that Better Measure “Sophistication” 
A tradeoff exists between classification of investors as sophisticated—
or accredited, for that matter—based on wealth and/or income, on the one 
hand, and on other, less simply quantified characteristics, as it is far easier 
to collect data on wealth and income. A middle ground, based on 
trustworthy principles, must exist; Professor Choi’s licensing proposal,158 
which could require investors seeking to participate in private offerings to 
pass a test, offers one model. 
While traditional methods of classifying investors may miss 
differences relevant to distinguishing those that are sophisticated from 
those that merely have significant assets at their disposal, alternative ways 
of characterizing market participants exist. As a practical matter, first, 
investors could be required to demonstrate their expertise in order to 
participate in transactions subject to fewer disclosure requirements. This 
                                                                                                                          
157 See supra Part III.B. 
158 See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
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would entail something more than a regulatory presumption in favor of 
sophistication if an investor has a certain amount of wealth.159 An investor 
seeking to participate in a private placement could be required to 
demonstrate sophistication affirmatively by describing participation in 
past, similar transactions, for example, or by describing steps taken to 
protect against losses on the proposed investment.   
The SEC could propose a more nuanced definition of “accredited 
investor,” requiring investors to earn the right to be considered 
sophisticated by providing evidence that they had acted like sophisticated 
investors in the past.160 Such a showing could be bolstered in a variety of 
direct and indirect ways, including describing past transactions, for 
example, or listing the professional conferences that the institution’s 
executives attend.161 Financial institutions would not be classified by their 
size162 but by their conduct—adopting a version of Aristotle’s observation 
that we are what we repeatedly do.163 Over time, a track record of effective 
management of the riskiness of particular transaction types in private 
offerings could result in access to more and larger such investments.164 One 
consequence might be that fewer institutional investors would purchase 
complex securities that are difficult to evaluate. With the benefit of 
hindsight, such caution appears to be a good thing, although to executives 
at financial institutions going forward, such a regulatory move would be 
undesirable.165 
                                                                                                                          
159 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
160 Existing legislation gives the SEC the authority to define who is an “accredited investor,” to 
whom an issuer may sell an unregistered security. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15) (2012) (“The term 
‘accredited investor’ shall mean . . . any person who, on the basis of such factors as financial 
sophistication, net worth, knowledge, and experience in financial matters, or amount of assets under 
management qualifies as an accredited investor under rules and regulations which the [Securities and 
Exchange] Commission shall prescribe.”). 
161 This would adapt some of the criteria identified by Professor Fletcher for application to 
institutions rather than individuals. See supra note 141. 
162 See supra Part III.A (describing the classification of investing institutions under regulations 
implementing the Securities Act). 
163 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729, 1746 
(Jonathan Barnes ed., W.D. Ross trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (“It is well said, then, that it is by 
doing just acts that the just man is produced, and by doing temperate acts the temperate man; without 
doing these no one would have even a prospect of becoming good.”). 
164 This would be consistent with the recommendations of Professor Fletcher. See Fletcher, supra 
note 141, at 1149–53 (listing criteria for evaluating investor sophistication). However, Professor 
Fletcher explicitly excludes institutional investors from the reach of his screening regime by asserting 
that the presumption of institutional investor sophistication “should be . . . conclusive.” Id. at 1153. 
This Article, informed by the financial crisis of 2008, does not endorse this view. 
165 A contrary view might be that allowing investors to diversify their holdings by buying 
securities in private offerings actually reduces their risk. Professor Kelli A. Alces has argued that a 
portfolio containing securities governed by different legal regimes can have this effect. Kelli A. Alces, 
Legal Diversification, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1977, 1980 (2013). The empirical question that must be 
answered, then, is whether investing in private offerings results in more or less overall risk to an 
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Such an approach would draw implicitly on the insights of the 
academic literature analyzing the relative abilities of different kinds of 
entities to manipulate complex systems in their favor.166 Companies that 
frequently purchase complex securities are more likely to be sophisticated, 
for example, and more likely to have accumulated the expertise to protect 
themselves from potential deception. Because such investors are more 
likely to have purchased such securities in the past, they are more likely to 
have experienced a variety of investment outcomes and to have invested in 
instruments to avoid potential losses. Repeat players, thus, have a stronger 
incentive to develop expertise in determining what a transaction is worth, 
the nature and magnitude of financial damage if it turns out poorly, and the 
appropriate steps to manage risk. 
Pursuing the same goal through a slightly different path, regulations 
could focus more precisely on the sources of income earned by a would-be 
investor in a private offering. The greater the share of that income that was 
generated by investment activity actively managed by the individual or 
entity seeking accreditation, the more financially sophisticated that 
individual or entity is likely to be. The advantage of this tactic is its 
relative simplicity, resting as it does on modest, additional disclosures. 
A more demanding screening mechanism for private offerings could 
create an incentive to game any approval process in the quest for higher 
returns. To weaken the power of this incentive, regulation of participation 
in private offerings could attach consequences; such investors, for 
example, could be required to waive certain types of claims or even to 
waive certain types of arguments in support of claims.167 Disclaimers 
                                                                                                                          
investor’s portfolio—in other words, whether investors successfully use private offerings to reduce 
losses in other parts of their portfolios. It is not clear that public pension funds in particular have been 
so successful. See Roger Lowenstein, How Pensions Make Investing Too Complex, FORTUNE (Nov. 8, 
2014), http://fortune.com/2014/11/08/how-pensions-make-investing-too-complex/ [http://perma.cc/CC 
83-P49R]. 
166 E.g., Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 113 (1974) (describing the process by which repeat litigators 
eventually “enjoy[] strategic advantages” in litigation systems). Works teasing out the implications of 
Professor Galanter’s analysis in a variety of systems should also be examined. Compare Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players 
in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 30 (1999) (analyzing the ability of “[h]ave-not[]” repeat 
players to be successful in the official system of courts in personal-injury actions), with id. at 32 (noting 
the many ways repeat players access “alternative justice systems”). Scholars have also approached the 
question of manipulation of systems of dispute resolution from other perspectives. E.g., John C. Coffee, 
Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and 
Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1020–21 (2012) (examining how financial 
regulatory reform legislation passed by lawmakers in response to financial crises is subsequently 
eroded as a result of lobbying by affected industries).  
167 At its core, this is an argument for some form of estoppel. Financial institutions that claim they 
were misled into purchasing certain assets, but who performed minimal or no due diligence before 
investing, should not then be permitted either to issue securities of their own through regulatory 
exemptions to registration requirements or to purchase securities sold pursuant to such exemptions. 
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would create a disincentive to participate in transactions that might be too 
exotic for those investors lacking the capacity to evaluate overly complex 
securities.168 
More subjective investor characteristics should be taken into account 
as well. For example, evaluation of internal controls governing investment 
activity is already required of public169 companies. Investors with weaker 
internal systems of internal controls170 in place to discourage short-sighted 
purchases or monitor investment performance might be classified as less 
sophisticated, thereby incorporating considerations of corporate 
governance into the exemption regulatory regime. 
The regulatory moves described above all recognize that financial 
market participants exist in a multidimensional space, and may 
simultaneously possess characteristics that suggest capacity to undertake a 
particular, complex investment safely, and characteristics that suggest an 
inability to do so. A more modern classification regime would evaluate 
investors in holistic fashion, considering both aptitude in the context of a 
particular transaction and past investment experience. Ideally, such a 
scheme would limit eligibility to reap the rewards of investing in 
potentially more complex securities to those best able to identify and 
manage the corresponding risks. 
These reform proposals, which would limit access to private offerings, 
may raise concerns about excessive paternalism. This is more than an 
abstract concern: new, federal restrictions on investment in private 
offerings by state pension funds undermine state autonomy. A challenge to 
such limits, perhaps undertaken by a pension fund facing a significant 
                                                                                                                          
This estoppel would create an incentive for institutional investors to perform more due diligence than 
many conducted prior to the 2008 financial crisis and, in cases of those institutions that fail to conduct 
adequate due diligence in the future, would help to prevent exposure to future losses that should have 
been avoided. 
168 There is a normative argument here, of course, that some investors should not participate in 
some transactions for the good of all investors. It is difficult to read the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 
and not reach the conclusion that harmful effects of the crisis might have been avoided had fewer 
entities entangled themselves in deals involving securities, the value of which depended on home loans.  
In a provocative article questioning the power of disclosure to prevent poor investment decisions, 
Professors Steven M. Davidoff and Claire A. Hill suggest going further than I do. They call “for an 
‘unsafe harbor’ under which investors attempting to justify their investment decisions to a court could 
not invoke reliance on third-party certification as their sole . . . decisionmaking technique.” Davidoff & 
Hill, supra note 127, at 636.  
169 Here, I am using the word “public” as a term of art, the narrow sense in which it is used in 
securities regulation. See Definition of “Public”, MERRIAM-WEBSTER UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, 
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/public [http://perma.cc/3JN6-6WHB] (last visited Oct. 4, 2015) 
(defining public as “capitalized in shares that can be freely traded on the open market”). 
170 There is a precedent for evaluation of such systems. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, for 
example, requires a “registered public accounting firm” to prepare audits and approval of “internal 
control[s]” at publicly traded companies. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404(b), 116 Stat. 745, 789 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (2012)).  
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shortfall and seeking to use potentially riskier investments to bolster its 
income and meet its financial obligations, would compel development of a 
complex and shifting area of law. The outcome of such litigation could 
have unexpected effects—perhaps salutary, perhaps not—on the new 
private offering limits and on public pension investing practices more 
generally. 
Perhaps changes in financial markets and the increasingly varied 
investor population are not so great a cause for concern. The rise of 
institutional investors,171 in particular, means that overall, more investors 
should be more experienced and more capable of protecting their own 
interests, and that more individual workers and savers should have the 
benefit of the expertise of intermediary institutions. Recently, at least one 
scholar has argued for greater access to opportunities to invest in private 
placements.172 However, fallout from the financial crisis has made clear 
that costs of poor investing practices are widely distributed. To limit 
participation in more complex and potentially risky transactions is a 
second-best solution, but the very nature of investments held by 
sophisticated entities makes it difficult, if not impossible, for an outsider, 
and possibly an insider, to gauge the potential costs of a mistake. Highly 
contingent investments are difficult to value, let alone net against each 
other. For example, executives at some of the financial institutions that 
proved to be overexposed to falling real estate prices were clearly 
unprepared for, and surprised by, the impact of the bursting bubble.173 
Taking into account the purpose of investment may provide a means of 
limiting the impact of such misjudgments. 
B. Investor Purpose: The Publicness Criterion 
No selection criteria can prevent all mistakes or eliminate the chance 
of losses on investments. The values of securities do not only increase; 
transactions can produce losers as well as winners. The question to wrestle 
with is: how much should those investment losses be permitted to 
undermine a public goal? While measures of experience, expertise, and 
resources should all figure in the evaluation of whether an investor should 
be permitted to buy potentially riskier securities through private offerings, 
an additional criterion should control—the purpose that the investor serves. 
                                                                                                                          
171 See Aguilar, supra note 128 (noting the increase in recent decades in the percentage of public 
company shares held by institutional investors). 
172 See Rodrigues, supra note 153, at 3430–34 (arguing that the general public should be 
permitted to participate in the private market using a structure akin to mutual funds).  
173 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Insurer’s Crisis, Blind Eye to a Web of Risk, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 27, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/business/28melt.html?pagewanted=all 
(describing the plight of AIG, which received substantial government support to weather the financial 
crisis after its exposure to real estate prices went unnoticed until it was too late). 
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To the extent that an investor’s mission is public in nature (meaning that 
the investor serves a goal that has greater societal significance and value) 
the risk of losses should be limited. The balance of this Part suggests how 
the “publicness” of an investor’s mission could be evaluated and what the 
regulatory consequences should be. 
If investment in private offerings would generate income for third 
parties, that would be a step toward publicness. But in many cases, large 
investors would respond that they buy both for themselves and for others. 
Who the others are must matter. Public pension funds present the easy 
case, while an insurance company might present a more difficult one. 
Investing on behalf of third parties alone does not confer publicness and 
additional questions help to clarify. If the third parties providing money for 
the investment are retail-level savers, such as workers who rely on a public 
pension fund and who, but for the fund as intermediary, would almost 
certainly not be investing in a private offering, that suggests a greater 
degree of publicness. If the third parties are financial institutions or 
wealthy individuals, on the other hand, that suggests that the investor does 
not serve a public mission.   
An even clearer indication that an investor serves a public goal would 
be its mission statement, if it has one. An institution dedicated to 
administering retirement benefits on behalf of public employers, for 
example, serves a public goal.174 Perhaps other missions could qualify, 
such as facilitating saving for higher education expenses, but the amounts 
held by public pension funds are far greater.175 The development of a list of 
institutions or institutional goals classified as public could be a politically 
vulnerable process, but given that institutions are likely to seek to avoid 
limits on their investment options, the risk of such manipulation seems 
low.   
If an investor serves a public mission, then regardless of its 
sophistication by other measures, its investments in private offerings would 
be limited. Determining the limit presents its own challenges, which 
highlight the absence of carefully considered baselines applicable to 
investment activity undertaken in the public interest.176 As of this writing, 
                                                                                                                          
174 E.g., CalPERS at a Glance, CALPERS (June 30, 2014), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms 
-publications/calpers-at-a-glance.pdf [https://perma.cc/63EW-E9EZ] (noting over 3000 total employers 
in the CalPERS retirement program, including the State of California, school districts, and public 
agencies, all of whom serve a public function). 
175 Compare Sources of Estimated Total U.S. Retirement Plan Assets, 2012, EMP. BENEFIT RES. 
INST., http://ebri.org/publications/benfaq/retfaqt4.jpg [http://perma.cc/SWD2-5LLD] (last visited Sept. 
18, 2015) (listing state and local government pension funds that together manage in total more than 
$4.5 trillion in assets), with Ron Lieber, Taxing 529 Accounts: A Plan that Went Awry, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 31, 2015, at B1 (stating that 529 college savings plans hold about $240.7 billion).   
176 For example, multiple intermediary institutions complicate the inquiry. If a public pension 
fund invests in a hedge fund, which in turn pursues an opportunity in the form of a private offering, the 
 
 2015] PRIVATE OFFERINGS AND PUBLIC ENDS 389 
the default rule is that a pension fund may risk total loss on an investment, 
even if the potential result could be inability to perform its obligations. A 
far more conservative approach would prohibit investment if total loss 
would have an impact on obligations to third parties within a set period of 
time, perhaps a decade. The trigger level could be adjusted. The limit could 
apply if a 90% or a 50% loss would have an impact, for example; the 
maximum permissible size of the impact could also be adjusted, as could 
the time frame in which that effect would occur.   
Perhaps there is a normative justification for allowing investors serving 
future retirees, for example, to risk total loss and resulting declines in 
payouts to beneficiaries, but the case needs to be made. The status quo, 
which ignores the public role that certain investing institutions play, cries 
out for explanation and justification. 
Put another way, investors serving public purposes should satisfy 
requirements like those applicable to banks and some other financial 
institutions. Some institutions must evaluate and disclose the riskiness of 
particular investments, and methodologies exist for doing so. For example, 
the SEC requires registrants to disclose “value at risk,” or VaR, defined as 
“the potential loss in future earnings, fair values, or cash flows of market 
risk sensitive instruments over a selected period of time, with a selected 
likelihood of occurrence, from changes in interest rates, foreign currency 
exchange rates, commodity prices, and other relevant market rates or 
prices.”177 
Some financial institutions, such as banks, must also perform “stress 
tests,” which seek to determine how an institution would weather 
changing, adverse circumstances, like falling asset prices or counterparty 
defaults on obligations.178 These simulations can be complex, taking into 
account the impact of an exogenous event on an entire portfolio, as well as 
the impact of performance of a single investment or investment class. 
Policymakers, thus, have a number of options in determining the steps that 
a public pension fund would have to take to establish its capacity to fulfill 
its public mission following investment in a private offering ranging from 
focus on the individual transaction to assessment of an entire portfolio.  
Such requirements can be gamed. Various approaches to risk 
assessment exist and may be selected strategically. Overall, trust in 
investors’ ability and willingness to evaluate risk accurately may be 
misplaced. These criticisms have been leveled at regulations mandating 
                                                                                                                          
hedge fund may not necessarily be subject to the same limits as the pension fund. But the pension fund 
could be required to limit its exposure to the hedge fund’s investments. 
177 17 C.F.R. § 229.305(a)(iii)(A) (2014). 
178 See Robert Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing Regulation, 98 MINN. L. 
REV. 2236, 2238–39 (2014) (describing how “stress tests” help explain how financial systems respond 
to dynamic and adverse marked conditions). 
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assessment by banks, for example.179 Hopefully in the case of pension 
funds, at least, the incentives should favor caution, in the interest of better 
serving beneficiaries. However, it is possible that requirements like those 
suggested in the preceding paragraphs could be manipulated.180 Unless the 
harm of attempting to protect the public mission of a particular investor 
outweighs the benefit, the idea merits careful consideration. 
It is well beyond the scope of this Article to develop a particular 
methodology for evaluation of risk, which is, itself, a question of great 
depth and complexity.181 The core claim advanced is that such a 
methodology should be a prerequisite to investing in a private offering for 
investors with public missions. Demanding stress tests under multiple 
scenarios, in which other investments perform well or poorly, could be 
required in advance of particularly large and risky investments. The burden 
of the disclosure itself would function as a screen, with only investors 
more determined and able to satisfy regulatory demands going forward.   
Beyond providing disclosure of risk exposure, a public-serving 
investor could be required to disclose how the impact of a loss, whether 
partial or total, would be managed. That plan could be submitted to an 
independent reviewer, such as an outside auditor, for approval and 
disclosure to the investor’s third-party beneficiaries. Again, the extent of 
required risk management controls could vary with the riskiness of an 
overall portfolio and the degree to which the investor had the resources to 
honor its obligations within a particular time frame, among other factors. 
The standard could be adjusted, but first the need for it must be recognized. 
The imposition of sanctions in cases in which investors incorrectly 
characterize their ability to withstand a total or partial loss on a particular 
transaction raises additional questions. There should be a penalty following 
deliberate misstatement—that is, misstatement made with scienter, as 
evaluated in any securities fraud action alleging violation of Section 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act182 and rule 10b-5183 thereunder. Even in the 
                                                                                                                          
179 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, The Regulator Effect in Financial Regulation, 98 CORNELL L. 
REV. 591, 631 (2013) (describing the shortcomings of such regulations). 
180 Or simply applied mistakenly. As Professor Macey notes, “[t]he financial crisis [of 2008] . . .  
showed that many of the VaR models [banks relied on] used faulty historical data and assumptions.” Id. 
at 633. Professor Macey voices concern that the existence of regulations may create an incentive to 
“alter . . . VaR models to lessen the apparent risk in what [is] actually an extremely risky series of 
actions.” Id. at 634. 
181 The Investor Advisory Committee to the SEC has proposed that, if the Commission maintains 
hard financial thresholds for participation in private offerings, then it should consider “limiting 
investments in private offerings to a percentage of assets or income,” a restriction that is perhaps more 
easily implemented. RECOMMENDATION OF THE INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 146,  
at 8. 
182 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012)). 
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absence of wrongful intent, though, an investor might be barred from 
future private offerings in the wake of a poor outcome in a past such 
investment.184 The poor outcome would need to be disclosed to those 
whose savings provide the investor with financial resources. 
The purpose of modifying the exemption regime applicable to private 
offerings to take into account investor purpose is not simply to protect 
particular investors, however sympathetic public pension plans may be. So 
far, public pension funds generally buy securities on public exchanges 
rather than through private placements. Nor is the goal to exclude 
unsophisticated, wealthy investors from these transactions simply because 
they are unsophisticated. In financial transactions, as elsewhere, someone 
often wins and someone loses. This Article does not suggest that investors 
should be protected from losses every time that they make a poor decision.  
But too many poor decisions and resulting losses may affect the 
achievement of specific, desirable public goals, and those risks must, at 
times, outweigh the right of investors to participate in particular 
transactions.185 The potentially public effects of investment outcomes in 
private offerings make them properly subject to restrictions. Government 
regulatory constraints on investor conduct under these circumstances seem 
reasonable because government policies that facilitate the entrusting of 
public goals to pension funds make it possible for those entities to earn 
quite a lot of money. The imposition of these restrictions would not be as 
extreme a step as it might appear at first blush because the SEC amended 
securities regulations not so long ago, in 1989, to enable public pension 
funds to invest in private offerings.186 Before 1989, access to private 
offerings was not limited in the nuanced and flexible way that this Article 
proposes—it did not exist.   
Applying the various tests described above, an extremely wealthy 
individual with little expertise might, nonetheless, be permitted to invest in 
a private placement involving a highly complex security, but a public 
pension fund with billions of dollars under management might not. The 
same criteria conceivably could apply to private pension funds and even 
other institutions that invest for the benefit of retail third parties. In the 
                                                                                                                          
183 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”).  
184 See supra note 160 and accompanying text (advocating for the SEC to propose a nuanced 
definition of “accredited investor,” which would require that investors earn the right to future 
investment).  
185 Excessive risk-taking may also harm the health of the financial system on which investors rely, 
and that system’s functioning may be considered a public goal as well. But that is not the emphasis of 
this Article, as systemic risk is already a recognized priority of financial regulation. 
186 See Accredited Investor and Filing Requirements, 54 Fed. Reg. 11369 (Mar. 20, 1989) 
(amending 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 230, and 239 to modify the definition of “accredited investor” to include 
government benefit plans). The then-new rule, 17 C.F.R. § 230.215, effected the change, and remains 
in force. 
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absence of a policy discussion over which institutions serve public ends 
and which do not, a principled distinction is elusive. The discussion below 
briefly illustrates how the above criteria might apply using the case of the 
San Diego pension fund described in Part I. 
C. A Brief Case Study: SDCERA Revisited 
The litigation involving SDCERA, discussed above,187 illustrates how 
the current investor classification scheme for private offerings manages to 
be simultaneously overbroad and under-inclusive by barring investors that 
may have the knowledge and skills to evaluate the risk posed by 
transactions from private placements, while admitting investors that lack 
the abilities and resources to evaluate risk and cope with poor investment 
outcomes. An investor may have the experience and intelligence to analyze 
a transaction and determine whether it is suitable,188 even though that 
investor does not have significant wealth or income; conversely an investor 
with sufficient assets may qualify as accredited or sophisticated even if 
utterly lacking in expertise. Further, and as a result, the classification 
regime may bar recovery through ex-post litigation even in the wake of 
potentially fraudulent conduct because a court may find itself compelled to 
conclude that a sophisticated investor should have better understood and 
investigated the transaction before entering into it. SDCERA fell victim to 
this Catch-22.189 
Before describing the litigation, very briefly, here are the elements of 
the kind of fraud claim made by SDCERA. The Supreme Court has 
identified six elements of a fraud claim under Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act and its implementing regulation, Rule 10b-5: “(1) a material 
misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a 
connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or 
sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) 
economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”190 The Court has defined scienter as 
                                                                                                                          
187 See supra Part I.  
188 See Suitability, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTHORITY, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.ht 
ml?rbid=2403&record_id=13390&element_id=9859&highlight=2111 [http://perma.cc/G8XV-3GGW] 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2015) (describing the requirement of the self-regulatory agency of securities firms 
that brokers limit their investment recommendations to securities “suitable” for the clients they serve). 
Among the factors that a broker may consider in determining which investments are appropriate for a 
particular client are “age, other investments, financial situation and needs, tax status, investment 
objectives, investment experience, investment time horizon, liquidity needs, risk tolerance, and any 
other information the customer may disclose to the member or associated person in connection with 
such recommendation.” Id.   
189 San Diego Cnty. Emp. Ret. Ass’n v. Maounis, 749 F. Supp. 2d 104, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(finding the sophistication of SDCERA made its investigation advisor’s reliance on allegedly 
fraudulent statements unreasonable as a matter of law). 
190 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011) (quoting Matrixx 
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2011)). 
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a mental state embracing “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” 191 
To date, in cases involving claims of securities fraud, the Supreme 
Court has not addressed the question of whether reliance by the plaintiff on 
an allegedly false statement or omission must be reasonable. This is so 
because the cases that have reached the Court have involved class actions 
in which plaintiffs typically have invoked the presumption of reliance 
allowed under the “fraud on the market” theory recognized in Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson.192   
However, lower courts hearing individual actions have wrestled with 
the question of the reasonableness of reliance and, in cases pitting large 
investors against large financial companies, that determination often poses 
a significant stumbling block for institutional 10b-5 plaintiffs.193 For 
SDCERA, this was the problem—it was too sophisticated an investor to 
have been defrauded, as the institution’s lawyers argued it had been. 
Indeed, under the current regime governing access to private offerings, 
SDCERA was sophisticated. The same conclusion might well be reached 
after applying the tests of investor characteristics as proposed above.  But 
the “publicness” criteria would create a high bar to the hedge fund 
investment that cost SDCERA more than $150 million.194 
According to its complaint, SDCERA invested $175 million in 
Amaranth Partners (the “Fund”), a hedge fund, in 2005,195 in a private 
offering.196 SDCERA alleged that Amaranth misrepresented and 
fraudulently concealed its investment strategy, hiding the fact that the Fund 
“operated as a single-strategy natural gas fund that took very large and 
highly leveraged gambles,” and not as a diversified investor as was 
claimed.197 When the price of natural gas fell in the fall of 2006, the Fund 
began to lose money and lenders began demanding repayment of loans that 
had helped fuel its natural gas purchases.198 Ultimately, the Fund lost more 
                                                                                                                          
191 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 45 U.S. 185, 19394 & n.12 (1976). 
192 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988) (“The fraud on the market theory is based 
on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market, the price of a company’s stock is 
determined by the available material information regarding the company and its business . . . . 
Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly 
rely on the misstatements . . . .” (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3rd Cir. 1986))). 
193  See Glater, supra note 14, at 88 (“[For] investors who purchased securities through a private 
placement and subsequently allege[d] fraud . . . the challenge . . . is more likely to be demonstrating 
reasonable reliance . . . .”). 
194 Complaint at 2, San Diego Cnty. Emp. Ret. Ass’n. v. Maounis, 749 F. Supp. 2d 104 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (No. 07-CV-2618). 
195 Id. at 2. 
196 See id. at 11 (stating that “[t]he Fund was structured as an unregistered pooled investment, 
privately organized and administered by Advisors, a professional investment manager”). 
197 Id. at 2. 
198  Id. at 33 (stating that “[b]y September 28, 2006, the spread fell to 42 cents . . . [and] SDCERA 
issued a written request for full redemption”). 
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than $6 billion.199 SDCERA sued to recover on its investment.200   
Would SDCERA have been able to invest in Amaranth had it been 
subject to the classification regime presented above and given its mission 
to serve county employees? SDCERA is a public pension fund, as clearly 
stated on its website.201 It has an explicit public mission: to provide for the 
retirement income of employees of San Diego County.202 These employees 
are third parties and retail savers, not other financial institutions with 
resources of their own. SDCERA’s investment in private offerings 
consequently would be subject to limitations, and the only question would 
be the nature and extent of those limits. The answer would turn on the 
institution’s ability to make payments to its beneficiaries over a period of 
ten years, assuming a total loss of its $160 million investment. This 
disclosure would have to include anticipated rates of return on the rest of 
the institution’s portfolio over the same period of time, thus giving some 
idea of the ease of managing the total loss. Further, SDCERA could be 
required to provide a description of a plan to mitigate the risk of the 
investment, by identifying hedges against the private offering, for example. 
As a result of these various constraints, SDCERA could very well have 
been barred from participating in the private offering and not suffered 
losses that hampered its ability to serve the county employees relying on it. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has described a regime directly addressing the problem of 
classifying investors, some of which may lack the ability to conduct due 
diligence even when they have the will to do so, some of which may lack 
the resources to monitor investments once made even if they do have the 
expertise to evaluate a transaction, and some of which may lack the means 
to absorb losses and still fulfill valued, public obligations. The 
participation of such an investor in private placements is risky to the 
investor, of course, but also to counterparties, counterparties to those 
counterparties, and beneficiaries of the investor, who all suffer the fallout 
when a transaction generates losses.   
Post-financial crisis securities litigation has highlighted the inadequacy 
of the current regime governing eligibility to invest in private offerings, 
which has permitted investors with significant assets but perhaps a degree 
of sophistication that is not commensurate to participate in complex and 
risky transactions. Market participants have grown more diverse, but the 
categories into which they are divided have not; the definition of 
                                                                                                                          
199 Id. at 2. 
200 Id. at 12. 
201 Pension Facts, SAN DIEGO CNTY. EMP. RET. ASS’N, http://sdcera.org/pension_facts.htm 
[http://perma.cc/7WU5-22VS] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). 
202 Id.  
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“accredited investors” requires careful rethinking. Further, investments 
increasingly serve public ends, providing retirement income to workers, for 
example. The classification regime outlined in this Article takes into 
account the purpose of the investment, thus addressing the particular risks 
posed by poor decisions by institutional investors that manage assets 
intended to perform significant, public roles. 
The concept of publicness is challenging to explore, and defining its 
scope requires wrestling with deep questions about what serves a common 
interest. Although this Article has focused on a more manageable subset of 
investors, public pension funds, and the particular regulatory regime 
governing access to private offerings, the implications of developing a 
broader and more complex understanding of what it means to be public 
extend much further and could encompass a variety of additional financial 
intermediaries providing income to support other public policy goals. The 
goal of this Article is to broaden the conversation about publicness, 
recognizing that there are myriad means by which we collectively seek to 
achieve public ends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 

